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1. Introduction 
Price discrimination under imperfect competition is an important area of economic 
research,1 and third-degree price discrimination, the most prevalent form of price 
discrimination, is a major item in any standard treatment of monopoly theory covered in 
intermediate and advanced microeconomics courses (see, for instance, Pindyck and 
Rubinfeld, 2008, or Varian, 1992, 2006). Under third-degree price discrimination the seller 
can charge different prices to consumers belonging to different groups or submarkets. For 
example, the seller may charge different prices to customers who are separated 
geographically (the home and the export markets) or that are differentiated by age (senior 
citizen's discounts), occupation (student discounts), time of purchases (initial equipment 
and replacement purchases), or by end use (milk for liquid consumption or for further 
processing). Moving from non-discrimination to discrimination raises the firm's profits, 
harms consumers in markets where the prices increase and benefits the consumers who face 
lower prices. Consequently, the overall effect on welfare is undetermined. 
Understanding the conditions under which the change in social welfare can be signed has 
concerned economists at least from the earlier work by Pigou (1920) and Robinson (1933). A 
move from uniform pricing to third-degree price discrimination generates, as will be shown 
below, two effects:2 firstly, price discrimination causes a misallocation of goods from high to 
low value users (that is, output is not efficiently distributed to the highest-value end); 
secondly, price discrimination affects total output. Therefore, since price discrimination is 
viewed as an inefficient way of distributing a given quantity of output between different 
consumers or submarkets, a necessary condition for price discrimination to increase social 
welfare is that it should increase total output.3 In consequence, in order for price 
                                                 
1 See Stole (2007), Armstrong (2008) and Liu and Serfes (2010) for excellent theoretical surveys. See also 
McAfee (2008) for a modern view of price discrimination and for antitrust implications. 
2 McAfee (2008) provides a nice explanation of these effects. 
3 See, for example, Robinson (1933), Schmalensee (1981), Varian (1985), Schwartz (1990) and more 
recently Bertoletti (2004). However, when marginal cost varies across markets that result does not 
maintain (see, Bertoletti, 2009). 
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discrimination to increase welfare a positive output effect must offset the negative effect of 
distributional inefficiency. 
Schmalensee (1981)'s direct approach to the welfare effect and Varian's celebrated bounds 
on social welfare (1985, 1989,1992) have dominated both the research and the teaching of the 
welfare effects of third-degree price discrimination for the last twenty-five years. Our 
analysis, inspired by the pioneering work by Ippolito (1980) and its generalization to n 
markets by Aguirre (2008), offers some advantages over Schmalensee's and Varian's. Firstly, 
it focuses directly on the change in welfare (instead of on indirect Lagrangian techniques or 
on exogenous bounds) and allows the output effect (that is, the social valuation of the 
change in total output) to be distinguished neatly from the misallocation effect. In addition 
we show how it is possible to prove the theorem that "a necessary condition for third-degree 
price discrimination to increase social welfare is that total output increases" by using this 
decomposition. Our approach to the welfare effects of discrimination is also more intuitive 
and can be illustrated graphically. 
2. Analysis 
Consider a monopolist selling a good in two perfectly separated markets. The demand 
function in market i (i=1,2) is given by ( )i iD p , where ip  is the price charged in that market 
and the inverse demand function is ( )i ip q , where iq  is the quantity sold. Unit cost, c, is 
assumed to be constant. The price elasticity in market i is given by '( ) ( ) / ( )i i i i i i ip D p p D p   . 
The profit function in market i, ( ) ( ) ( )i i i i ip p c D p   , is assumed to be strictly concave, 
'' 0i  . 
2.1 Profit maximization 
Under simple monopoly pricing, profits are maximized by charging all consumers a 
common price 0p  such that: 
 
2 2
0 0 ' 0
1 1
( ) ( ) ( ) 0i i
i i
D p p c D p
 
      (1)  
Therefore, under uniform pricing, the optimal policy is given by 0 0 0( ) / 1 / ( )p c p p   , 
where 0p  denotes the uniform price and 0( )p  is the elasticity of the aggregate demand at 
0p . If we let 
2
1
( ) ( )iiD p D p  denote the aggregate demand, then this elasticity is simply 
the weighted average elasticity: 
20 0 0
1
( ) ( ) ( )i iip p p   , where the elasticity of market i is 
weighted by the "share" of that market at the optimal uniform price, 
20 0 0
1
( ) ( ) / ( )i i iip D p D p   . Let 0iq  denote the quantity sold in market i,  0 0( )i iq D p  
( 1,2i  ), and 0q  denote the total output, 20
1
( )iiq D p , under uniform pricing which can 
be expressed as follows: 
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2 2
0 0 0 ' 0
1 1
( ) ( ) ( )i i
i i
q D p p c D p
 
      (2) 
It is illustrative to evaluate the marginal profit in market i ( 1,2i  ) at the optimal uniform 
pricing: 
 
0 0
' 0 0 0 ' 0 0 ' 0
0 ' 0 0
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) .
( )
i
i i i i
i
D p p c
p D p p c D p p D p
p D p p
         
       (3) 
Therefore, the marginal profit becomes: 
 ' 0 0 ' 0
0 0
1 1
( ) ( ) .
( ) ( )
i i
i
p p D p
p p
        
 (4) 
The monopolist is willing to increase (decrease) the price in market i if the elasticity in that 
market, 0( )i p , is lower (higher) than the elasticity of the aggregate demand, 0( )p . 
Condition (4) can be written, equivalently, as 
0 0
' 0 0 ' 0
0 0 0 0 0
( ) ( )1
( ) ( ) .
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
i j
i i
i i i j j
D p D p
p p D p
p p D p p D p
          
 
which leads to 
0 0
' 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ,
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
i j
i j i
i i j j
D p D p
p p p
p D p p D p
          (5) 
where , 1,2,i j j i  . Note that ' 0( ) 0i p   iff 0 0( ) ( ),j ip p    , 1,2, .i j j i   Therefore, if 
possible the monopolist would want to increase the price in the market with lower elasticity 
of demand and to reduce the price in the market with higher elasticity of demand. 
Under price discrimination, the optimal policy for the monopolist is given by: 
 '( ) ( ) ( ) 0, 1,2.d d di i i i iD p p c D p i     (6) 
where dip  denotes the optimal price in market i (and profit functions are assumed to be 
strictly concave in the relevant range). Under price discrimination, the optimal policy for the 
monopolist can be expressed as ( ) / 1 / ( ), 1,2,d d di i i ip c p p i     where 
'( ) ( ) / ( )d d d di i i i i i ip D p p D p    is the price-elasticity in market i. That is, the Lerner index in 
each market is inversely proportional to its elasticity of demand and the monopolist 
therefore sets a higher price in the market with the lower elasticity of demand. The quantity 
sold in market i is ( ), 1,2.d di i iq D p i   Total output under price discrimination is 
2 2
1 1
( )d d di i ii iq q D p     Given the first order conditions in (6), total output can be 
expressed as: 
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2 2
'
1 1
( ) ( ) ( ).d d d di i i i i
i i
q D p p c D p
 
       (7) 
The change in the quantity sold in market i is given by 0 , 1,2.di i iq q q i     We assume with 
no loss of generality that market 1 is the market with the lower elasticity of demand (the 
strong market) and market 2 the market with the higher elasticity (the weak market). We 
have implicitly assumed that both markets are served under both price regimes so, given the 
strict concavity of the profit functions, then 01 2 .
d dp p p  4 
Therefore, price discrimination decreases the output in market 1 and increases output in 
market 2: 1 0q   and 2 0q  . The effect of third-degree price discrimination on social 
welfare depends crucially on the change in the total output given by 0 1 2
dq q q q q       . 
We next show that the demand curvature plays a relevant role in determining the effect on 
total output. 
2.2 The change in total output and demand curvature 
Given conditions (2) and (7), the change in total output, 0dq q q   , is given by: 
 
2 2
0 ' 0 ' 0
1 1
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ).d d di i i i
i i
q q q p c D p p c D p
 
          (8) 
We can write condition (8) as: 
 
0
2
'
1
( ) ( ) .
d
ip
i i i
i p
q d p c D p

          
   (9) 
Therefore, we get: 
0
2
' ''
1
( ) ( ) ( ) ,
d
ip
i i i i i i
i p
q D p p c D p dp

           
   
0
2
''
1
( ) ( ) ,
d
ip
i i i i i
i p
q p c D p dp

          
   
 
0
2
''
1
1
( ) ( ) .
2
d
ip
i i i i
i p
p c D p dp

        
    (10) 
From (10) we obtain that the effect of third-degree price discrimination on total output 
depends on the demand curvature in each market.5 If the demand in the lower elasticity 
                                                 
4 See in Nahata et al. (1990) the analysis when profit functions are not strictly concave. 
5 See, for example, Robinson (1933), Schmalensee (1981), Shih, Mai and Liu (1988), Cheung and Wang 
(1994), Cowan (2007) and Aguirre, Cowan and Vickers (2010). 
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market is strictly concave (strictly convex) and the demand in the higher elasticity market is 
strictly convex (strictly concave) then total output increases (decreases) with price 
discrimination. When all demands are linear output remains unchanged. 
2.3 Welfare effects 
A move from uniform pricing to price discrimination generates a welfare change of: 
 
1 2
0 0
1 2
1 1 1 2 2 2[ ( ) ] [ ( ) ] ,
d dq q
q q
W p q c dq p q c dq        (11) 
that is, the change in welfare is the sum across markets of the cumulative difference between 
price and marginal cost for each market between the output under single pricing and the 
output under price discrimination.6 As output decreases in the market with lower elasticity 
 
 
Fig. 1. Welfare effects of third-degree price discrimination. 
                                                 
6 We consider the case of quasilinear-utility function with an aggregate utility function of the form 
 2
1
( )i i ii u q y  , where iq  is consumption in submarket i and iy  is the amount to be spent on other 
consumption goods, 1, 2i  . It is assumed that ' 0iu   and '' 0iu  , 1, 2i  . 
p 
q
p 
1( )D p
2 ( )D p
1
dp
1
dq 01q
0
2q 2
dq
0p
2
dp
q 
c 
1q 1q q
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of demand and increases in the market with higher elasticity of demand, the first term in 
(11) is the welfare loss in market 1, whereas the second term is the welfare gain in market 2.7 
Figure 1 illustrates how the welfare effect of third-degree price discrimination is measured 
as the addition of the (negative) change in total surplus in market 1 and the (positive) 
change in total surplus in market 2.8 
We want to break down the effect on social welfare into two effects: a misallocation effect, 
which can be interpreted as the welfare loss due to the transfer of q units of production from 
market 1 (the market with lower elasticity) to the market 2 (the market with higher 
elasticity), and an output effect, which can be interpreted as the effect of the change in total 
output on social welfare. Obviously, the effect of total output on social welfare crucially 
depends on whether third-degree price discrimination increases total output or not. Then 
we decompose the change in welfare into the two effects for the case where price 
discrimination increases total output.9 
We assume that 0q   and since the change in total output is given by 1 2q q q     , the 
change in output in market 2 is 2 1q q q      1 0q q     . We can express the change in 
welfare as: 
 
0
1 2 1 2
0 0 0
1 2 2 1
1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2( ) ( ) [ ( ) ] ,
d dq q q q
q q q q
W p q dq p q dq p q c dq


         (12) 
Given that 0 , 1,2,di i iq q q i     we have: 
 
0 0 0
1 1 2 1 2 1
0 0 0
1 2 2 1
1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2( ) ( ) [ ( ) ] ,
q q q q q q q
q q q q
W p q dq p q dq p q c dq
   

         (13) 
which under quasilinear utility '( ) ( ), 1,2,i i i ip q u q i   becomes: 
 
0 0 0
1 1 2 1 2 1
0 0 0
1 2 2 1
' ' '
1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2( ) ( ) [ ( ) ] ,
q q q q q q q
q q q q
W u q dq u q dq u q c dq
   

         (14) 
Taking into account that the optimal uniform price satisfies 0 ' 0 ' 01 1 2 2( ) ( )p u q u q   and by 
adding and subtracting 0 1( )p c q  , see Figure 2, we can express the change in welfare as: 
 W ME OE     (15) 
                                                 
7 The overall effect on welfare may be positive or negative. See Aguirre, Cowan and Vickers (2010) for 
sufficient conditions based on the shape of the demand and inverse demand functions to determine the 
sign of the welfare effect. 
8 Ippolito (1980) and more recently Cowan (2011) analyze the effect of third-degree price discrimination 
on consumer surplus and find reasonable settings where the effect is positive. In a related paper Leeson 
and Sobel (2008) consider costly price discrimination. Note that if consumer surplus increases then 
social welfare would increase even though price discrimination costs offset the private incentive to price 
discriminate. 
9 The Appendix considers the case where price discrimination reduces total output. 
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Fig. 2. The addition and subtraction of 0 1( )p c q  . 
where the misallocation effect, ME, and the output effect, OE, when total output increases 
0q   are given by: 
 
0 0
1 1 2 1
0 0
1 2
' ' 0 ' ' 0
1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2[ ( ) ( )] [ ( ) ( )] ,
q q q q
q q
ME u q u q dq u q u q dq
 
       (16) 
 
0
2 1
0
2 1
'
2 2 2[ ( ) ] .
q q q
q q
OE u q c dq
 

    (17) 
The misallocation effect (16) can be written as: 
 0 0 0 01 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 2 2[ ( ) ( )] [ ( ) ( )],ME u q u q q u q q u q          (18) 
and may therefore be interpreted as the welfare loss due to the transfer of 1q  units of 
production from market 1 to market 2. The output effect (17), OE, can be interpreted as the 
effect of additional output on social welfare. It is positive because the social valuation of the 
increase in output exceeds the marginal social cost. Figure 3 illustrates the output effect (the 
green area) and the misallocation effect (the red area). 
p 
q
p
1( )D p
2 ( )D p
1
dp
1
dq 01q
0
2q 2
dq
0p
2
dp
q 
c 
1q 1q q
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Fig. 3. Output and Misallocation Effects. 
3. Some lessons on the welfare effects of price discrimination 
Some important lessons can be drawn from the above analysis: 
i. An increase in total output is a necessary (but of course not sufficient) condition for third-
degree price discrimination to increase social welfare. This conclusion is not based on 
exogenous bounds. Since the misallocation effect, (16), is always non-positive then a 
positive output effect (based on an increase in output) is needed to increase social 
welfare. In fact, that argument represents an earlier, easier and more intuitive 
demonstration of the theorem that an increase in output is a necessary condition for 
discrimination raises social welfare. Under linear demand, given that total output 
remains constant, social welfare is reduced by price discrimination. 
ii. Market Opening. In the above analysis we assume that both markets are served under 
both price regimes. We now analyze the case in which third-degree price discrimination 
serves to open markets; that is, we assume that market 2 is only served under third-
degree price discrimination. Note that in this case 01 2
d dp p p   and therefore 1 0q   
and 2 2 0
dq q   . Therefore, in this case price discrimination not only increases social 
welfare but also implies a Pareto improvement. Notice that the misallocation effect 
would be zero and the output effect would obviously be positive given that total output 
increases. 
iii. The use of linear demands is not appropriate for illustrating the welfare effects of third-
degree price discrimination. Non-specialized readers might reach the conclusion that 
p 
q
p 
Misallocation effect 
Output effect 
1( )D p
2 ( )D p
1
dp
1
dq 01q
0
2
q
2
dq
0p
2
dp
q
c 
1q 1q q
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the only way for third-degree price discrimination to increase welfare is by opening 
markets. However, the change in welfare depends on two effects: a misallocation effect 
and an output effect. It is easy to construct examples where price discrimination 
increases social welfare but both markets are served. 
Aguirre, Cowan and Vickers (2010) find sufficient conditions, based on the curvatures of 
direct and inverse demand functions for third-degree price discrimination to increase (or 
decrease) social welfare. Their main results are that the output effect is stronger than the 
misallocation effect (that is price discrimination increases social welfare) when inverse 
demand in the weak market is more convex than that in the strong market and the price 
difference with discrimination is small, and discrimination reduces welfare when the direct 
demand function is more convex in the high-price market. 
Cowan (2011) shows that aggregate consumer surplus is higher with discrimination if the 
ratio of pass-through to the price elasticity (at the uniform price) is the same or larger in the 
weak market.10 As an application he shows that discrimination always increases surplus for 
logit demand functions whose pass-through rates exceed 0.5 (so demand is convex). Note 
that an increase in the consumer surplus ensures an increase in social welfare given that 
price discrimination increases profits (at least for a monopolist). Therefore, with this 
demand family results are just contrary to those under linear demand: the output effect 
always dominates the misallocation effect for logit demand functions (with pass-through 
rates exceeding 0.5). 
The constant elasticity demand family is very appropriate for illustrating the tradeoff 
between the two effects given that as total output increases with discrimination (see, 
Ippolito, 1980, Aguirre, 2006, and Aguirre, Cowan and Vickers, 2010) output effect is 
positive. If both the share of the strong market under uniform pricing and the elasticity 
difference between markets are big enough then the output effect dominates to the 
misallocation effect (see, Aguirre, 2011). 
iv. Third-degree price discrimination is a topic covered by any microeconomics text book. 
However, there is a gap in the literature with respect to an appropriate graphical 
analysis of the effects on social welfare.11 The above analysis fills this gap and provides 
a graphic treatment that is accessible for most readers and highlights the welfare effects 
of third-degree price discrimination. 
4. Advantages over the Schmalensee’s and Varian’s analyses     
We next compare our analysis with Schmalensee's and Varian's. 
Schmalensee (1981) in his graphical analysis decomposed social welfare into two effects:12 
                                                 
10 Pass-through is extensively analyzed by Weyl and Fabinger (2011) and shown to be a unifying 
concept which generalizes and simplifies the analysis of many industrial organization models. 
11 Graphical presentations of third-degree price discrimination typically focus on the comparison of the 
corresponding profit maximization problems. See for example Round and McIver (2006) and Weber and 
Pasche (2008) for recent analysis. 
12 In order to facilitate comparison we have rewritten his graphical analysis in terms of our notation. 
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Fig. 4. Schmalensee (1981)’s Output and Misallocation Effects. 
0 0
1 1 2 2
0 0
1 2
' ' 0 ' ' 0
1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2[ ( ) ( )] [ ( ) ( )]
q q q q
q q
W u q u q dq u q u q dq
 
       
 
0
2 1
0
2 1
' 0
2 2 2[ ( ) ] ,
q q q
q q
u q c dq
 

    (19) 
where the third term on the right hand in (19) may be equivalently written as 0( )p c q  . 
Schmalensee (1981) named the first two terms the (negative) distribution effect and the last 
term the output effect. In contrast, in our paper the output effect is the social valuation of an 
increase in output (that is the valuation of the consumers in the most elastic market). Figure 
4 shows how in the Schmalensee's approach the distribution effect and the output effect are 
overstated and overlapped. His output effect (the green area plus the blue area), 0( )p c q  , 
exaggerates the social valuation of the increase in total output. It is more reasonable to 
define the output effect as the valuation of the additional output by the elastic market 
consumers (that is, those consumers enjoying the increase in output); i.e. the green area. On 
the other hand, the Schmalensee's distribution effect overestimates the negative effect of 
distributional inefficiency: the red areas plus the (negative) blue area. Our approach 
presents two advantages: firstly, it allows to interpret the misallocation effect as the welfare 
p 
q
p 
1( )D p
2 ( )D p
1
dp
1
dq 0
1
q
0
2
q
2
dq
0p
2
dp
q 
c 
1q 1q q
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loss due to the transfer of 1q  units of production from consumers in market 1 to 
consumers in market 2 and, secondly, it identifies the output effect by stating the social 
valuation of an increase in output as the increase in total surplus of consumer in market 2, 
the most elastic demand market.  
Varian (1985) obtained upper and lower bounds on the change in welfare when moving 
from uniform pricing to third-degree price discrimination. By using the property of 
concavity of the utility function the bounds on welfare change are: 
 0 1 1 2 2( ) ( ) ( )
d dp c q W p c q p c q            (20) 
or in terms of marginal willingness to pay: 
 
0 0 0
2 1 1 1 2 1
0 0 0
2 1 1 2
' 0 ' '
2 2 2 1 1 2 2 2 2[ ( ) ] [ ( ) ] [ ( ) ] .
q q q q q q q q
d d
q q q q
u q c dq W u q c dq u q c dq
    

           (21) 
The upper bound provides a necessary condition for price discrimination to increase social 
welfare (that is, an increase in output) and the lower bound a sufficient condition. Our 
approach presents some advantages over Varian's. One crucial advantage relates to the 
graphical analysis: his graphic treatment goes not very further from the one market case as it 
appears in Varian (1992)'s text book. On the other hand, the bounds are not very 
informative. Consider for example the two cases used by Varian (1992) to illustrate the 
bounds: (i) linear demands and (ii) market opening. In both cases, our approach allows to 
compute exactly the welfare change. (i) Under linear demands (21) becomes: 
 
0
1 1
0
1
' '
1 1 2 2 10 [ ( ) ( )] .
q q
d d
q
W u q u q dq

      (22) 
and however our analysis states, from (15), (16) and (17), that: 
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q q q q
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W ME u q u q dq u q u q dq
 
          (23) 
On the other hand, when uniform pricing serves to open markets ( 01 2
d dp p p   and 
therefore 1 0q   and 2 2 0dq q   ) the bounds on social welfare are: 
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while the change in social welfare is given by: 
 
0
2 1
0
2 1
'
2 2 2[ ( ) ] .
q q q
q q
W OE u q c dq
 

      (25) 
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5. Concluding remarks 
Based on a pioneering paper by Ippolito (1980) we construct a simple model which allows 
the welfare effects of third-degree price discrimination to be well understood and explained. 
The decomposition of the change in welfare into a misallocation effect and an output effect 
has advantages over the well-established analyses by Schmalensee (1981) and Varian (1985). 
In particular, our approach provides an earlier and easier proof of the theorem that an 
increase in output is a necessary condition for welfare to improve and a graphic analysis 
which clarifies the welfare analysis of third-degree price discrimination. 
6. Appendix 
Here we decompose the change in welfare into two effects for cases where third-degree 
price discrimination does not increase total output. When total output does not increase 
0q   it is more illustrative to express the change in welfare as: 
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1 2 2 2 1
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which under quasilinear utility '( ) ( ), 1,2,i i i ip q u q i   becomes: 
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By adding and subtracting 0 2( )p c q  , the misallocation effect and the output effect can be 
expressed as follows: 
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The misallocation effect can be written as: 
 0 0 0 0
1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2[ ( ) ( )] [ ( ) ( )],ME u q u q q u q q u q          (A5) 
and may therefore be interpreted as the welfare loss due to the transfer of 2q  units of 
production from market 1 to market 2. The output effect, OE, can be interpreted as the effect 
of the reduction in output on social welfare. It is negative because the social valuation of the 
increase in output exceeds the marginal social cost. 
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